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Abstract

Spinnewijn (2013) posits that optimism about risk and the efficacy of risk-reducing effort
could cause selection in insurance markets. We test for this using a survey of 474
subjects’ demand for hypothetical cancer insurance. We elicit perceptions of baseline
cancer risk and control efficacy and combine these with subject-specific cancer risks
predicted by the Harvard Cancer Risk Index to develop measures of baseline and control
optimism. We find that only 23 percent of our subjects would purchase a fair insurance
contract aligned to their true risk type. Of these subjects, 94 percent also overinvest in
prevention, leading to advantageous selection.

iii

Acknowledgements and Declaration of Co-Authored Material

This thesis is based on an article of the same title, co-authored with Professor Mary
Riddel and submitted in December 2014 to The Economic Journal for publication
consideration. Prior to my involvement in the research project that supports this article,
Dr. Riddel envisioned and developed the theoretical framework using the Harvard
Cancer Risk Index (HCRI), created a survey design around the HCRI, and wrote the actual
Qualtrics online survey that was used in this study. Dr. Riddel also personally conducted
the first round of data gathering, soliciting Amazon Mechanical Turk responses from 214
female subjects, in October and November of 2013.

Upon joining the project in October 2013, I performed a literature review and assisted in
the data analysis of the initial 214 subjects. I helped extend the project’s scope to
include males, adapting the survey to include questions relating to males (in particular,
prostate cancer-related questions), in conformance with the relative risk measures
contained in the HCRI. I conducted my own survey using Amazon Mechanical Turk in
April 2014, on 279 male subjects. In an effort to improve statistics for female subjects, I
also conducted a survey of an additional 56 female subjects, using Dr. Riddel’s original
female survey, in September 2014.

Both Dr. Riddel and I participated heavily in the analysis, econometric modeling, and
hypothesis testing in support of this research. We also each wrote significant portions
iv

of the aforementioned article. In compliance with policies of the Graduate College and
by consent of the Department of Economics, I have adapted this article and made
additional contributions, to form the body of the thesis.

The portions of the thesis that rely most heavily on Dr. Riddel’s original authorship are
Section I, Overview, Section III, Testing for Selection in a Hypothetical Market, and
Section IV, Survey Considerations. Section II, Literature Review, is primarily my effort,
but with significant contributions and editing by Dr. Riddel. Section V, Indexes for
Optimism and Effort, represents one of my primary contributions to this effort. In it I
describe my development of a logarithmic, composite set of indexes that we applied in
the econometric modeling. Section VI, Selection Model and Results, incorporates
significant contributions from both of us. Section VI.C. (Insurance Selection
Classification Model) was primarily Dr. Riddel’s effort, and Section VI.D. (Population
Classification Predictions and Confidence Intervals) was primarily my effort. In this
latter section, Dr. Riddel made the crucial recommendation that I use the Delta Method
approach to estimate confidence intervals, and she provided me helpful references in
applying this technique. Dr. Riddel and I collaborated and contributed jointly to the
results portion of Section VI, as well as to Section VII, Discussion, and to Section VIII,
Conclusions.

In all portions of the article and this thesis, including those parts that are my primary
authorship, I owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to Dr. Riddel for allowing me to join in
v

this research effort, and for her guidance, inspiration, mentorship, and on more than
one occasion, her patience in correcting and teaching me economic theory and the art
of applied econometrics, both as an instructor, as an experienced researcher, and as my
thesis advisor.

Additional acknowledgements are due to Dr. Stephen Brown, particularly for his
suggestion of adding a final “logic trap” question at the end of the male survey, to
detect whether survey respondents were answering questions in a haphazard manner,
but also for his enormous and consistent guidance, support, and mentorship since I first
took his graduate research seminar, and later as his teaching assistant, where he taught
me how to teach. Dr. Hokwon Cho similarly provided helpful guidance in helping me
understand bivariate normal distributions, and to apply these in a mathematically
correct manner. As my instructor in several statistics courses, he also helped me
develop theoretical “bones,” on which best to build strong econometrics “muscle.” Dr.
Jeffrey Butler provided helpful behavioral economics insights, both in regards to the
current research, and to future possible extensions. Dr. Ian McDonough provided very
helpful econometric advice, as well as some very welcome encouragement.

Finally, the comments provided by participants of two conferences I attended with Dr.
Riddel, in which she presented earlier versions of the paper, were very helpful in the
writing of both the article and this thesis: The Harvard Risk, Perception, and Response
Conference, held at the Harvard School of Public Health in March 2014, and the
vi

Behavioral Insurance Workshop, held at the Ludwig-Maximilians University of Munich in
December 2014.

vii

To my wife Stephanie, for always being there for me, and for teaching me to celebrate
life;
to my daughters Jamie and Julie, for inspiring and encouraging me with their sense of
wonder of the world;
and
to my grandson Kaden, for his youthful, innocent spirit that never fails to put a smile on
my face.

viii

Table of Contents

Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….iii
Acknowledgements and Declaration of Co-Authored Material……………………………………iv
List of Tables……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….xi
List of Figures………………………………………………………………………………………………………………xii
I. Overview……………………………………………………………….…………………………………………………1
II. Literature Review………………………………………………..…………………………………………………..6
III. Testing for Selection in a Hypothetical Market………………………………………………………10
IV. Survey Considerations…………………………………………………………………………………………..13
IV.A. Risk Perception……………………………………………………………………………………….14
IV.B. Risk Preference……………………………………………………………………………………….16
IV.C. Health History and Objective Cancer Risk……………………………………………….16
IV.D. Cancer Insurance Demand…………………………………………………………………….17
IV.E. Cognitive Ability……………………………………………………………………………………..18
IV.F. Demographics…………………………………………………………………………………………18
V. Indexes for Optimism and Effort…………………………….………………………………………………19
VI. Selection Model and Results………………………………….………………………………………………28
VI.A. Optimism and Preventative Behavior……………………………………………………..28
VI.B. Baseline Optimism and Demand for Insurance……………………………………….32
VI.C. Insurance Selection Classification Model…………………………………………………35
VI.D. Population Classification Predictions and Confidence Intervals……………..38
ix

VII. Discussion…………………………………………………………………….………………………………………48
VIII. Conclusions………………………………………………………………….……………………………………..51
Appendix I. Notes of Survey Methodology…………………………………………………………………53
Appendix II. Derivation of Partial Derivative of Bivariate Normal Cumulative
Distribution Function………………………………………………………………………………………55
Appendix III. Copy of Qualtrics Survey……………………………………………………………………….60
References………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….81
Author’s Curriculum Vitae…………………………………………………………………………………………..84

x

List of Tables

Table 1

OLS Models of Prevention Effort: Dependent Variable is Prevention Effort
index……………………………………………………………………………………………………29

Table 2

Effects of a Change in the Independent Variables in Table 1 on Cancer
Risk as a Result of a Change in Prevention Effort…………………………………30

Table 3

Probit Models of Willingness to Pay for Insurance: Dependent Variable
Equals One if the Subject Agreed to the Insurance at the Offered
Premium………………………………………………………………………………………………33

Table 4

Results of the Bivariate Probit Classification Model………………………………37

Table 5

Subject Population Classified as Adverse or Advantageous Selectors
Based on Bivariate Probit Model, with Confidence Intervals derived from
the Delta Method and Bootstrap Procedure…………………………………………46

xi

List of Figures

Figure 1

Histograms of Baseline and Control Optimism for Males and Females…22

Figure 2

Histograms of Estimated Standard Errors of Individual Classification
Probabilities………………………………………………………………………………41

xii

I. Overview

Economists have long posited that asymmetric information with heterogeneous risk
types can lead to adverse selection in insurance markets (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976).
Individuals with private information that they are high-risk types tend to buy more
coverage than low-risk types. High-risk types will also have higher claims, leading to a
positive correlation between insurance coverage and claims. Such positive correlations
have been found in some markets, but rejected in others. For example, Puelz and Snow
(1994) find evidence of adverse selection in the market for automobile insurance, but
Chiappori and Salanie (2000) do not. By contrast, Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) reject
the hypothesis of adverse selection in their study of long-term care insurance.

These mixed findings concerning adverse and advantageous selection have led
researchers to look for other sources of private information and selection in insurance
markets. De Meza and Webb (2001) develop a model where risk aversion leads to
advantageous selection as more risk-averse subjects buy more insurance and
simultaneously engage in more prevention behavior leading to a negative correlation
between coverage and claims. Fang, Keane, and Silverman (2008) examine the market
for Medi-gap insurance (a supplement to Medicare). They found that when cognitive
ability is controlled for, a negative correlation between coverage and ex-post claims is
found, indicative of advantageous selection. They conclude that the correlation arises
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because cognitive ability is correlated with both good health and the purchase of health
insurance.

A recent paper by Spinnewijn (2013) posits that heterogeneity in risk misperceptions
may also affect the relationships between coverage and claims, leading either to
advantageous or adverse selection. Spinnewijn (2013) recognizes two dimensions of
risk misperception. First, subjects may be relatively “baseline optimistic,” meaning they
believe their risk of damages is lower than it actually is. Baseline optimistic subjects are
theorized to demand less insurance than their more pessimistic counterparts. “Control
optimists” overestimate the risk reductions arising from engaging in preventative
activities and avoiding risky activities. As a result, they overinvest in risk-reducing
activities relative to their true risk type, leading to lower expected insurance claims.
Assuming a simple model with two insures with different perceived risk types and
incentive-compatible equilibrium contracts, Spinnewijn (2013) shows that if one insuree
is more baseline and control optimistic than the other, a positive correlation between
coverage and claims will occur. A negative correlation results if the more control
pessimistic type is also relatively more baseline optimistic. Thus, depending on the
correlation between the control and baseline optimism of the two insurees, either
adverse or advantageous selection may result.

Using an online survey of 478 US adults aged 18 and older, we investigate the effects of
risk misperception on the willingness to pay for a hypothetical cancer insurance policy
2

and future expected cancer insurance claims, controlling for risk preferences, cognitive
ability, and potentially important demographic variables. We choose cancer insurance
because much is known about the role demographics and behavioral choices play in
forming cancer risks. We elicit baseline risk perceptions, perceptions of the efficacy of
prevention efforts and risk factors related to colon, prostate, and bladder cancer for
men and colon, bladder and breast cancer for women. We query subjects about their
behaviors that may either reduce or increase risks for one or more of these cancers. We
elicit estimates of the subject’s degree of risk aversion using the Holt and Laury’s (2002)
multiple price-list elicitation method. We measure cognitive ability using a short
intelligence assessment.

To our knowledge, no other research has empirically evaluated the role of risk
misperceptions in selection in insurance markets. This is likely because there are few
insurable events for which data are available on actual and perceived risk. Thus, the
strength of this study is that our measures of cancer-risk misperception rest on applying
subjects’ survey responses to the Harvard Cancer Risk Index (HCRI) (Colditz et al. 2000).
The HCRI was developed at the Harvard Center for Cancer Prevention, by a working
group of “epidemiologists, clinical oncologists, and other Harvard faculty with
quantitative expertise focused on cancer and risk assessment” (Ibid.). The HCRI
provides quantitative relative risk (RR) factors for each demographic or health
behavioral attribute that experts believe bear on the risk of incidence of a given cancer.
The HCRI can thus be used to calculate the risk a subject will contract cancer,
3

conditional on a set of behavioral and demographic traits. By asking subjects to
estimate their risk of incidence of each cancer, and comparing that with the HCRI
estimates, we derive a measure of their baseline optimism. Similarly, by asking subjects
how effective a series of preventative measures are in reducing cancer risk, and how
risky a series of unhealthy behaviors are, and then comparing them with the
corresponding HCRI RR factors, we derive a measure of their control optimism.

Standard tests for advantageous or adverse selection rest on the sign of the correlation
between insurance coverage and claims: positive correlation suggests adverse selection,
whereas negative correlation implies advantageous selection. The hypothetical nature
of the survey reported in the current paper necessitates a different approach to testing
for selection. We first test whether baseline and control optimism influence prevention
effort, and thereby affect the risk of contracting cancer. Next, we test whether baseline
optimism causes people to under-insure relative to their true risk type. In both models
we control for other factors, such as cognitive ability risk aversion, and demographic
variables which may influence willingness to pay for insurance and prevention effort.
This approach allows us to classify subjects according to whether their willingness to pay
for insurance and prevention efforts are high or low relative to their true risk type and
health preferences while controlling for other factors that may lead to selection. Given
these classifications, we can infer whether positive or negative correlation between
coverage and claims will be present in our sample.
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Our findings offer strong support for Spinnewijn’s (2013) hypothesis that risk
misperception can lead to selection in insurance markets. We find that male subjects
who underestimate their likelihood of cancer incidence (baseline optimists) are willing
to pay less for full insurance, ceteris paribus. The effect is not present for female
subjects. We also show control optimists of both genders engage in more prevention
and fewer risky health behaviors, indicating that, on average, their cancer risks and
insurance claims will be lower. At the same time, baseline optimism leads subjects to
engage in less preventative effort, thereby raising their cancer risk and associated
expected claims.

Our classification model indicates that optimism causes over 76 percent of our sample
to reject an actuarially fair insurance contract. Of the remaining subjects, 23 percent
accept the contract and simultaneously engage in excess prevention; the final 2 percent
accept the contract but under-invest in prevention. Thus we show that controlling for
risk aversion and cognitive ability, optimism drives most high-risk types out of the
market, leading to advantageous selection.
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II. Literature Review

Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) introduced the theory of adverse selection, hypothesizing
that even small amounts of asymmetric information in competitive markets can lead to
significant distortions of market-clearing prices and quantities. They focused their study
on the market for insurance, where they posited that when insurees of heterogeneous
risk types have private information about their level of risk, adverse selection may
result. Individuals who know they are high-risk types tend to buy more coverage than
low-risk types. High risk-types will also have higher claims, leading to a positive
correlation between insurance coverage and claims. With the resulting downwardsloping marginal cost curve, the average cost curve is at all times above the marginal
cost curve, leading at best to an under-provision of insurance to those with the lowest
levels of risk. Depending on the risk premiums individuals place on insurance, a
complete unraveling of an insurance offering is possible (see Einav and Finkelstein
(2011) for a more detailed discussion).

The seminal paper by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) spurred a robust theoretical and
empirical literature. Much of the empirical work involved estimating correlations
between the amount of insurance coverage and ex-post expenditures on claims
predicted by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). A positive correlation suggests adverse
selection, whereas a negative correlations points to advantageous selection. For
example, Chiappori and Salanie (2000) analyzed data from automobile insurance
6

contracts for young French drivers and found that, when observables are adequately
taken into account, no evidence of asymmetric information remains. They concluded
that this may be because young drivers do not know their risk types, and older drivers
do not know more about their risk types than do the insurance companies. However,
Cohen (2005) performed a similar examination of automobile insurance data and found
a significant positive correlation between coverage and claims for more experienced
drivers, suggesting these more experienced drivers may have learned about their own
risk types to a greater extent than had their insurers and less experienced drivers,
leading to information asymmetries that result in adverse selection.

De Meza and Webb (2001) noted several previous studies that found either a lack of
evidence of adverse selection, or even a negative correlation between coverage and
claims. They proposed a model in which an additional factor, risk aversion, plays a key
role. They theorized that less risk-averse people are less likely to take precautions, but
also less likely to purchase insurance. This then leads to a negative correlation between
coverage and risk, and therefore advantageous selection, particularly in the presence of
significant administrative costs.

In a similar vein, Fang, Keane, and Silverman (2008) found advantageous selection in the
market for Medi-gap insurance (a supplement to Medicare). They found that,
controlling only for gender, age, and state of residence (the determinants of policy
prices), Medi-gap policyholders spent on average $4,000 per year less on health care
7

than similar-aged Medicare recipients who do not purchase Medi-gap insurance.
However, when they included a robust set of controls for health, they found that those
with Medi-gap spend about $2,000 more than those without Medi-gap. They controlled
for additional individual attributes and found that when cognitive ability is controlled
for, a negative correlation between coverage and ex-post claims is found, indicative of
advantageous selection. They proposed that as cognitive ability is correlated with both
good health and the purchase of health insurance, it leads to a negative correlation
between Medi-gap coverage and health risk.

Underscoring the sometimes complex dynamics underpinning the demand for
insurance, Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) identified multiple forms of private
information that can potentially affect the correlation between insurance coverage and
risk occurrence. They proposed that it is possible for two or more types of private
information to have offsetting effects, leading to behavior that lacks a correlation
between risk type and coverage. In the long-term care insurance market, they identified
wealth and healthcare preventive activities as being positively correlated with insurance
coverage, and negatively correlated with risk.

A range of other studies have produced varying results, which the authors attribute to
the particular characteristics of the markets under study. For example, Davidoff and
Welke (2004) found evidence of advantageous selection in the reverse mortgage

8

insurance market. He (2008) found adverse selection in the life insurance market with
significant correlation between mortality risk and life insurance coverage.

More recently, Spinnewijn (2013) advanced the idea that risk misperception may also
lead to selection in insurance markets. His model assumes two types of risk
misperceptions which, acting together, can lead to either adverse or advantageous
selection. Policyholders who are “baseline optimistic” believe their risks of experiencing
insured events are lower than they actually are; such individuals demand less coverage
and engage in less preventative effort, ceteris paribus. Those who are “control
optimistic” believe their efforts to mitigate potential negative health effects are more
effective than they actually are. Under Spinnewijn’s hypothesis, control optimistic
individuals believe that the marginal return to effort is higher than it actually is, and
therefore overinvest in effort and hence reduce their expected ex-post claims relative to
an individual with accurate or pessimistic views about the return to effort. All other
things being equal, an individual who is control optimistic is likely to have lower claims,
due to their greater amount of preventative care and avoidance of risky health
behaviors. Thus, whether adverse selection is possible rests on the relative influence of
baseline and control optimism on insurance demand and prevention effort.
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III. Testing for Selection in a Hypothetical Market

To our knowledge, a database that includes subject-level coverage and claims data as
well as measures of subjective control and baseline optimism related to cancer risk and
insurance does not exist. As such, we take a novel approach to investigating selection in
insurance markets. Rather than analyzing historical insurance coverage and claims data,
we classify subjects into four classes according to difference in willingness to pay and
exertion efforts relative to the corresponding values given their true risk type. We then
determine who will purchase an insurance contract with fixed coverage at a given
premium and how much effort they will exert. This allows us determine how optimism
influences the composition of insured parties and the effort they exert. If the market is
dominated by low-risk types who exert high levels of effort, we infer advantageous
selection.

Assume a group of risk-averse subjects who are identical in all respects save for their
levels of baseline and control optimism. The subjects’ willingness to pay for insurance
coverage R given their true risk type is price P*  P f   where P f is the actuarially
fair price and  is equal to the risk premium the subject is willing to pay. If a subject is
baseline pessimistic, then they perceive their risk to be higher than their true risk type,
and they will be willing to pay Ph  P * for coverage R. Baseline optimists will be willing
to pay Pl  P * . Thus if an insurer offers coverage R at P*, baseline optimists will reject
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the coverage thereby underinsuring relative to their true risk type, whereas baseline
pessimists will purchase it, considering it to be a bargain.

Of course, whether this leads to adverse or advantageous selection depends on how
baseline and control optimism influence behavior. Assume that if the subjects
understood the actual efficacy of prevention effort, they would invest E* in effort. If the
combined effects of baseline and control optimism lead the subject to overinvest in
effort relative to their true risk type and preferences, then the invest E h  E * ,
underinvestment attributable to baseline and control optimism is then E l  E *.

Define class Cij where i  1 if E  E h  E * and 0 otherwise and j  1 if P  Ph  P *
and 0 otherwise. Thus, class C11 expends more prevention effort and has a surplus
willingness to pay, while C10 expends excess effort but underinsures relative to their
true risk type. To understand how this classification reveals selection, consider the case
where only two classes exist in the market, C10 (excess effort, deficient willingness to
pay) and C01 (deficient effort, excess willingness to pay). As classed, these subjects are
equal in all respect save for their level of control and baseline optimism and
corresponding effort and willingness to pay. If fair insurance based on the true risk type
is offered, C10 class will continue to overinvest in effort but will not insure since their
willingness to pay is less than the premium offered. They will only enter the market if
the price is dropped below P *. The market will be dominated by the C01 type since
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their willingness to pay exceeds the fair price plus the risk premium. This will cause
adverse selection since the type that insures also underinvests in prevention effort.

The outcome will differ depending on the mix of types. Another simple case arises
when the market is comprised of solely the C11 and C00 types. The former type will buy
fair insurance and overinvest in effort whereas the latter type will reject the insurance
even as they underinvest in prevention effort. Thus the high-risk, low-effort type is
driven out of the market by their optimism and the market will be composed of the lowrisk type, leading to advantageous selection.
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IV. Survey Considerations

We conducted an online survey of 474 men and women aged 18 and over on Amazon
Mechanical Turk (AMT)1. The AMT web service is essentially a labor market designed to
match employers who need short tasks completed which require human intelligence to
workers willing to complete the task. The tasks, which typically require between 5 and
45 minutes to complete, range from surveys and writing brief product descriptions to
transcribing audio recordings. Employers sign up for the service and post task
descriptions together with a per-task compensation amount. Employees select tasks
using the web as the employer/employee interface.

AMT has become increasingly popular over the past five years with social science and
business researchers because of the ease of use of the platform and the streamlined
and rapid process for recruiting study volunteers. Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling
(2011) found that AMT is an inexpensive source for high-quality data. They showed that
participants are slightly more diverse than a typical internet sample and much more
diverse than a sample based on university students. They also found that the data
quality was at least as high as a standard internet or telephone survey design.

1

Note that we collected survey data from a total of 559 respondents (280 women, and 279 men); of
these, we excluded a total of 85 survey responses for several reasons: 1) the survey respondent indicated
she or he currently or previously had cancer, rendering the HCRI relative risk factors, and therefore our
survey design, unapplicable; 2) the Amazon Mechanical Turk-provided latitude and longitude suggested
the respondent was located outside the United States; 3) the respondent’s Amazon Mechanical Turk
Identification Number or Internet Protocol address suggested a duplicate response.
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For our study, the task was described to potential participants as a survey related to
their beliefs about the cancer risks that would take about 20 minutes. Subjects were
given between $2.25 and $4.50 to complete the survey. The survey used a split-sample
design. One half of the participants began the survey with information about the
causes, risk factors, and prevention strategies for one of the three cancers of interest
(colon, bladder and breast for women and bladder, colon, and prostate for men).
Following the information section, these subjects began the questionnaire. The other
half of the subjects commenced with the questionnaire without any prior information
given about cancer risks. We created an indicator variable, info, which we use in our
modeling efforts to control for the effects of the information booklet.
The questionnaire has six components, described below:

IV.A. Risk Perception
Risk perception and misperception have two dimensions in the survey. We first queried
subjects about their beliefs about the efficacy of cancer-prevention activities and
perceptions of the riskiness, in terms of increased cancer risk, of different risky health
behaviors. The responses were combined with the expert-assessed efficacy of different
activities and used to form measures of control optimism. The second dimension relates
to the subject’s view of their own risk of contracting each one of the cancers.
Comparing the subjective assessment of risk to the actual risk predicted by the HCRI
allows us to calculate a measure of baseline optimism. Below, we briefly describe the
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risk-perception elicitation questions. The formulas for the actual calculations for the
two types of optimism are described in section V.

Subjects were first asked to grade the decrease (increase) in relative risk in contracting a
given cancer, contingent on undertaking specific preventative (risky) activities. 2 The
activities considered varied with the cancer.3 For example, risk factors for bladder
cancer included smoking and exposure to chemicals, whereas risks for colon cancer
included excessive red meat consumption and a low-calcium diet among others.
Prevention activities for colon cancer included regular exercise, taking multivitamins and
taking a daily aspirin, among others.

Following the questions about relative risks, subjects were asked to state their personal
risk of getting each one of the cancers in their lifetime, compared to the typical subject
of their same age and gender. The possible outcomes ranged from zero risk of getting
the cancer (Zero. There is no chance of me getting this cancer), to very high risk (very
much above average, five times or more above average).

2

The relative risks for each preventative activity were presented as both ranges and qualitative
descriptors as follows: not effective/does not reduce cancer risk, somewhat effective/reduces risk
10% to 20% below the average person of the same age and gender, moderately effective/reduces
risk 30% to 60% below the average, very effective/reduces risk 60% to 80% below the average,
and extremely effective/reduces risk by more than 80% below the average.
3
The relative risks for each characteristic or behavior were presented as both ranges of relative
risk and a qualitative descriptor as follows no risk increase, small risk increase, risk is higher but
less than double the average risk, moderate risk increase to 2 to 4 times the average risk, large
risk increase to 4 to 8 times the average risk, and very large risk increase to more than 8 times the
average risk.
15

IV.B. Risk Preference
This section elicited a range for the risk aversion coefficient for the Constant Relative
Risk Aversion utility function defined over mortality risks using the sequential multiple
price list auction. Details of this aspect of the experiment can be found in Riddel and
Kolstoe (2013). Briefly, the subjects read the following text describing the gambles they
will face:
Hypothetical Health Risk: Assume you have been diagnosed with a
disease that will certainly be fatal in a year without treatment. There are
two treatments, but neither is effective 100% of the time. Assume the
costs of the treatment are the same, and neither treatment has side
effects.
The subjects were then given a sequence of paired lotteries, and asked to select the one
they preferred. For example, the first gamble presented was:
Treatment A means a 30% chance of 8 more years of life and a 70%
chance of 2 more years. Treatment B gives a 90% chance of 1 more year
(the treatment fails) and a 10% chance of 13.5 more years.
In subsequent gamble pairs, the outcome in treatment B was varied so that

E[ A]  E[ B] gradually decreases, and eventually becomes negative. The analyst notes
where the subject switches from preferring lottery A to preferring lottery B, with later
switch points indicating higher levels of risk aversion.

IV.C. Health History and Objective Cancer Risk
Subjects were asked a detailed history of their activities, behaviors, and family history
for things that may influence their risks of contracting the three cancers of interest.
Questions covered their family history of the cancers in question and health related
16

behaviors such as exercise, vitamin use, smoking, chemical exposure, and alcohol use.
The responses to these questions were used to provide an objective estimate of their
risk of getting each of the cancers, using the HCRI from Colditz et al. (2000).4

IV.D. Cancer Insurance Demand
The subjects next faced a single-bounded contingent valuation exercise to determine
their demand for cancer insurance. The insurance for males in the sample was
described as follows:
Assume that there is an insurance policy available that will cover any and
all costs related to the covered cancers. The cancers covered by the
insurance are bladder cancer, prostate cancer, and colon cancer.5
Considering your current budget, would you be willing to pay the
following monthly premium for this insurance assuming it covered all
related costs including diagnostic testing, office visits for specialists,
hospital stays, treatment costs including chemotherapy and radiation, as
well as FDA approved experimental treatments. There are no copays or
deductibles and you would be able to choose your own doctors and
hospitals. Please assume that your current insurance will not cover these
cancers and that you will have to pay all of the costs yourself if you get
any of these cancers.
Subjects were randomly assigned a bid amount ranging from $5 to $135 per month and
asked if they would be willing to pay that amount for the insurance as described.

4

Note that the resulting (relative) risk estimates are normed against the U.S. population of
persons of the same age and gender. Although we know of no method of estimating cancer risk
that can claim to be without error or possible bias, we assume that risk estimates derived using the
HCRI methodology are sufficiently accurate to use in estimating subjects’ levels of baseline and
control optimism.
5
Women were asked about insurance that covers bladder, colon and breast cancer.
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IV.E. Cognitive Ability.
Subjects were asked to answer a series of 7 questions used in the Wonderlic cognitive
ability test. The subject scored a one on each question if they gave the correct answer
and a zero otherwise. The variable Cognitive Ability was calculated as the sum of the
individual scores.

IV.F. Demographics.
Subjects were asked their gender, age, income, ethnicity, education level, and marital
status. Variable Age is measured in years, variable Income is measured in thousands of
dollars of annual income, while Boolean indicator variables are assigned based on
whether one has completed at least a bachelor’s degree (College,) whether one is
Married, is Male, is African American (Black), or Asian American (Asian).
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V. Indexes for Optimism and Effort

Given subjects’ perceptions of their risk of contracting cancer and their beliefs about the
efficacy of prevention efforts, we need to form measures of baseline and control
optimism. While there is no generally agreed on formula for combining perceived and
actual risks, we believe that any measure allows us to easily understand the degree of
optimism in terms of a relative risk i.e. subject believes their risk is half that of their true
risk type. Consistent with this thinking, we developed the measures described below.

V.A. Measure of Baseline Optimism
A subject is baseline optimistic if they underestimate their true risk of cancer relative to
those in the US population of their own age (and, in the case of breast and prostate
cancers, of their same age and gender). Thus, we measure Baseline Optimism by
comparing each subject’s stated population-relative risk estimate of incidence for each
of the three cancers, with the subject’s “actual” population-relative risk factor (“ARR”).
We calculate the ARR by applying each subject’s responses to demographic, family
history, and lifestyle questions in our survey to the risk estimates tabulated for those
behaviors in the HCRI. Given each subject’s survey answers, we then estimate the ARR
of subject i's risk of incidence of cancer j as follows:

ARRij 

ko ( j )
1
 RR jk  i 
PD   i  k 1

(1)
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where k0  j  is the number of relative risk factors for cancer j identified in the HCRI,  i
is a vector of subject i’s demographic characteristics, family history, and lifestyle
choices, RR jk  i  is the HCRI relative risk measure for subject i for factor k of cancer j,
and PD  i  is a population denominator derived from the National Cancer Institute’s
Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results (SEER) Program.6 As cited in Colditz et al.
2000, the resulting population-relative risk factor gives expert opinion-derived estimates
of given subject’s risk of incidence of cancer j, relative to the US population of persons
the same age (and for breast and prostate cancers, gender). Thus, a ARRi,j value of 1.0
implies subject i has an average risk of cancer j incidence equal to the average of
persons in the U.S. of the same age and gender; a value of 2.0 suggests cancer risk that
is twice the average, and a value of 0.5 suggests cancer risk that is half the U.S. average.

The survey asked subjects to estimate their risk of contracting each of three cancers
(colon, bladder, and breast for women; colon, bladder, and prostate for men), again
relative to persons their same age and gender. Consistent with the methodology
suggested in Colditz et al. (2000), we structured survey questions to range from “Very
much below average risk,” corresponding to a relative risk value of 0.2, to “Very much
above average risk,” corresponding to a relative risk value of 5.0.7 We label subject i’s

6

Note that as we did not have access to the SEER population denominator for prostate cancer, we
used an estimate of 1.107372, based on the average (non-normalized) relative risk factors of our
sample of 218 men.
7
In addition to the seven levels of relative risk suggested in Colditz et al. 2000, we also allowed
survey respondents to select “No risk,” which we code as a relative risk factor equal to 0.01.
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stated estimates of relative risk of cancer j as SRRij, and then using values for ARRij and
SRRij, we can create a measure of subjects’ baseline optimism as follows:
 ARRij
Baseline Optimismij  log 2 
 SRR
ij



 .


(2)

Here, a value for Baseline Optimism of 0.0 implies that a subject’s own estimates of
cancer incidence risk (for cancer j) are identical to the expert-derived HCRI estimates,
based on her responses to survey questions regarding demographic, family, and lifestyle
characteristics. A Baseline Optimism value of 1.0 indicates that the subject’s estimates
of cancer incidence risk are half of the expert-derived value (making her risk perceptions
relatively optimistic), and a Baseline Optimism value of -1.0 indicates the subject’s risk
estimates are twice that of the expert value (making her risk perception relatively
pessimistic). Each increase (decrease) of one point in our measure thus has the effect of
doubling the amount by which expert risk assessments exceed (are exceeded by)
subjects’ own-risk estimates.

Next, we calculate on overall all estimate of each subject’s tendency to exhibit baseline
optimism by taking the average of the separate measures for each of the three cancers
considered in our study:
3
3
 ARRij
Baseline Optimismi   13   Baseline Optimismij   13   log 2 
 SRR
j 1
j 1
ij
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.


(3)

Figure 1 gives the distribution of Baseline Optimism for males and females. Roughly ¾
of each gender in our sample are baseline optimistic. The distribution for females is
somewhat higher variance (std. dev.=1.55) than that of males (std. dev.=1.24).
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Figure 1. Histograms of Baseline and Control Optimism for Males and Females
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2

3

V.B. Measures of Control Optimism
We label a subject as “Prevention Control Optimistic” if she believes that engaging in
beneficial activities is more effective in reducing cancer risks than it actually is.
Similarly, we label a subject as “Risk Control Optimistic” if he believes that engaging in a
particular risky activity is more likely to lead to cancer than it actually is; we therefore
infer that he overestimates his ability to reduce cancer risks by avoiding or curtailing the
risky activity in question.

The survey contained a set of questions for each cancer about perceptions of the
relative riskiness of different activities that increase or decrease cancer risk. For a given
cancer j and beneficial activity k, subjects were asked to estimate risk-reducing factors
between no risk reduction effect (RR=1.0) and a risk reduction of ten-fold (RR=0.1).
Comparing these estimates with “actual” expert estimates for each cancer and
preventative measure associated with each cancer, subject i’s level of prevention
control optimism is then estimated as:

Prevention_Control_Optimismi 

3 k prev ( j )

1
3

 k prev ( j )


j 1

j 1


k 1

 APRR jk
log 2 
 SPRR
jk






where k prev  j  is the number of preventative measures identified in the HCRI for cancer
j, APRR jk is the HCRI-assessed “actual” post-preventative behavior k relative risk of
cancer j, and SPRR jk is the subject’s estimates of relative risk of incidence of cancer j,
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(4)

assuming behavior k (with possible responses coded with RR values ranging from 0.1 to
1.0).

By taking the base-2 logarithm of this ratio, and averaging over the total number of
preventative measures identified for each of the three cancers in question, we arrive at
a measure of optimism exhibited by subject i for a typical preventative measure. A
Prevention_Control_Optimism value of 0.0 suggests the subject’s estimates of
prevention effectiveness are, on average, equal to the “actual” expert estimates. A
measure of 1.0 implies that on average, the subject believes preventative measures are
twice as effective as they actually are; a measure of -1.0 implies that on average, the
subject believes preventative measures are half as effective as they actually are.

Similarly, but with one crucial difference, we estimate each subject’s level of risk control
optimism as follows:

Risk_Control_Optimismi 

3 krisk ( j )

1
3

 krisk ( j )
j 1


j 1


k 1

 SRRR jk
log 2 
 ARRR
jk






where krisk  j  is the number of risky activities identified in the HCRI for cancer j, ARRR jk
is the HCRI-assessed “actual” post-preventative behavior k relative risk of cancer j, and

SRRR jk is the subject’s estimates of relative risk of incidence of cancer j, assuming
behavior k (with responses coded with RR values ranging from 1.0 to 5.0). Note that to
produce a consistent meaning the ratio between stated and “actual” risk factors is
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(5)

inverted relative to preventative activities. That is, if a subject’s stated risk estimate for
a given cancer and risky behavior is double the “actual” expert relative risk value, she is
a Risk Control Optimist for that particular activity and cancer combination.

Finally, we average the values of the two variables for each subject, to arrive at a
characteristic level of control optimism for each subject:8

Control Optimismi  12  Prevention_Control_Optimismi  Risk _ Control _ Optimismi 

(6)

An overall Control Optimism measure of 0.0 indicates that the subject accurately
assesses the efficacy of prevention efforts. When Control Optimism = 1, the subject
believes engaging in preventative measures (avoiding risky activities) is twice as
effective in reducing cancer risk than is actually the case; a measure of -1 implies that,
on average, the subject believes exerting such effort is half as effective in reducing
cancer risk as it actually is.

The distribution of Control Optimism for males and females is given on the right-hand
side of Figure 1. Roughly 93% of males and 90% of females are optimistic about
prevention activities. Both the male and female Control Optimism distributions have
significant right skew, with the male distribution being markedly platykurtic, and the
female distribution somewhat less so.
8

Note that we elected to weight values for prevention and risk control optimism equally in this
estimate, rather than weighting by the number of preventative or risk-related attributes for each
cancer. We did this to avoid overweighting the influence of risk-related attributes, of which more
were identified in the HCRI (29 for women, 24 for men) than were preventative-related attributes
(18 for women and 13 for men).
25

V.C. Measure of Preventative Effort and Associated Change in Cancer Risk
To estimate the level of effort each subject exerts in relation to cancer-avoiding or
cancer-inducing activities, we employ a composite index based on the relative risks from
the HCRI for three activities associated with reducing at least one of the three cancers
(exercising at least three hours a week, taking a daily vitamin D supplement, and taking
a daily baby aspirin) and three risky behaviors (high red meat consumption, high alcohol
consumption, and cigarette consumption):9
6

Preventative Efforti  im  log 2  RRm 

(7)

m 1

where im is a boolean operator, indicating whether subject i engages in
preventative/risky behavior m , and RRm is the relative risk associated with activity m.
We construct the index such that engaging in risk-reducing activities will contribute a
positive value to our index of preventative effort, while engaging in risk-increasing
activities will contribute negative values to the index.

Note that to more accurately identify a potential causative effect between risk
perception and risk-related behavior, we restrict the activities in our index to those that
can be directly controlled by subjects in the near- to mid-term. Thus, we exclude
relative risk measures for, say, a subject’s body mass index, as one’s body weight may

9

Note that for cigarette consumption, the HCRI identifies four different levels of risk: 1) nonsmoker; 2) smoking less than 1 pack per day; 3) smoking between 1-2 packs per day; 4) smoking
more than 2 packs per day.
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not be a direct measure of near- to mid-term choices, but rather may be a result of lifelong eating and exercising habits, as well as genetics.

A Preventative Effort index value of 0.0 implies that a subject engages in none of these
six behaviors with bearing on cancer risk, or alternatively that he engages in a
combination of risky and preventative behaviors in such a way that his risk is the same
as if he engaged in none of them. An index value of 1.0 implies that when confronted
with the decision of engaging or not engaging in each of these six behaviors, the
subject’s choices are such that (in aggregate) his risk of incidence of one or more of the
identified three cancers is half what it would be if he engaged in none of these activities.
An index value of -1.0 implies his risk is twice what it would otherwise be. Importantly,
the prevention index can be used to translate differences in prevention effort into
expected differences in cancer risk, using the formula:

%Cancer Risk  100[2Preventative _ Efforti 1].

(8)
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VI. Selection Model and Results

As noted above, rather than inferring selection from correlations between actual
coverage and claims, we investigate how baseline and control optimism influence the
composition and behavior of consumers in our hypothetical cancer-insurance market.
To do so, we must first gauge how optimism influences willingness to pay for coverage
and prevention effort. In the models results below, we determine if optimism
influences cancer-prevention activity, hence cancer risk and expected claims. In the
subsequent sub-section, we estimate models of willingness to pay for insurance as a
function of optimism and a set of control variables. For both sets of models, we include
a model with all subjects as well as models of the individual genders to account for the
fact that males and females were asked about a different set of cancers.

VI.A. Optimism and Preventative Behavior
To test whether optimism affects behavior, we examine the relationship between
engaging in either risky health behaviors or prevention activities as a function of
baseline and control optimism. Prevention and risk-taking behavior is captured in the
index for prevention, Prevention Effort, described above. It is possible that prevention
effort and optimism are endogenous. We test for endogeneity using the Durbin-WuHausman test (Wooldridge 2003 pg. 506). There is no evidence of endogenity, so we
estimate the model using least-squares regression with standard errors corrected for
heteroskedasticity. The regressions also control for other attributes of each subject that
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are likely to correlate with prevention effort such as cognitive ability, risk preferences,
age, income, education, marital status and ethnicity. The results are reported in
Table 1:

Table 1. OLS Models of Prevention Effort: Dependent Variable is Prevention Effort index

The first column includes all subjects, while the second and thirds columns estimate
models for subsamples of men and women, respectively. Because Prevention Effort is
constructed according to a log 2 scale, direct interpretation of the coefficients is difficult.
To aid the reader in understanding the model results, we have calculated the change in
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cancer-mortality risk for changes from a specified baseline relative risk for each of the
statistically significant independent variables. The results are reported in Table 2:10

Table 2. Effects of a Change in the Independent Variables in Table 1 on Cancer Risk as a Result
of a Change in Prevention Effort

According to the models, ethnicity, marital status, income, risk aversion, and cognitive
ability are not significant predictors of prevention in any of the three models. Age is not
significant in the female model, but has a convex relationship with prevention effort in
the all-subjects and male models. The minimum effort level occurs at 45 years’ age in
both models, suggesting that as subject’s age, their prevention effort declines until

10

To calculate the percent change in cancer risk attributable to the relevant independent variable,
we first calculate the change in the prevention for a change in variable X j as
Preventative _ Effort ( X j ) 

%Cancer Risk X j  100[2

Effort
X j . The change in cancer risk is then
X j

Preventative _ Effort ( X j )

 1] .
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about the population median age (about 46 years old in the U.S.), then increases
thereafter. Thus, if the average 45-year old male were to change his behavior so as to
engage in preventative effort at the same level as the average 31-year old (the 25th
percentile of the population age distribution), his age-adjusted risk of cancer would drop
by 8%. Similarly, is he were to boost his preventative efforts to match those of the
average 58-year old, his age-adjusted cancer risk would fall by 8.2%.

The model results indicate that baseline optimism leads to higher cancer risks for the
majority of the subjects in the sample. Subjects with baseline optimism measures in the
highest quartile of distribution engage in behaviors that, as a result of this optimism,
increase their cancer risk by at least 13.7%. The figure is slightly lower for males (11.5%)
and higher for females (15.6%). For the median subject, cancer risks are increased by
4.9% in the all-subjects model. The lowest quartile of subjects, who are baseline
pessimistic, actually experience a modest decline in their cancer risk.

We hypothesized that control optimists, believing that preventative activities are more
effective than they actually are, would engage in more effort and thereby lower their
cancer risks. The model results bear this out. In the all subjects model, the most
optimistic 25% of the sample experience a 13.3% or greater decline in their cancer risk
as a result of relatively high level of prevention effort. As with baseline optimism, the
effect is slightly stronger for females. The effect of control optimism on cancer risk is
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still quite large at the median and in the lowest quartile, with cancer risks falling by 8.9%
and by as much as 4.2%, respectively, in the all-subjects model.

VI.B. Baseline Optimism and Demand for Insurance
The second component of selection concerns the willingness to pay for full insurance.
We estimate three probit regressions (all subjects, male and female) with the
dependent variable Yes  1 if the subject agrees to pay the stated premium for
insurance and zero otherwise. The regressors include Premium (the insurance premium
offered to the subject), Cognitive Ability, Risk Aversion, and a set of demographic
controls. To investigate the effect of baseline optimism on the demand for insurance,
the models include Baseline Optimism and the Baseline Optimism*Info interaction
variable. The interaction variable allows us to test whether the information on cancer
risks and causes provided immediately prior completing the survey mitigates the
distortionary influence that optimism about one’s cancer risk may have on the
insurance-purchase decision. Again, we conducted a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test
(Wooldridge 2003 pg. 506) and failed to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of
Baseline Optimism in the probit model.

The model results appear in Table 3. In the all-subjects model, the coefficient of the
premium amount is negative and statistically significant, indicating that as the plan
premium increases, people demand less cancer insurance, all else equal. Older subjects
and higher-income subjects have a higher willingness to pay for the insurance than their
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younger, lower-income counterparts. Subjects who report that they are of African or
Asian descent have a higher willingness to pay than those who self-report as Caucasian
or Hispanic. Cognitive ability and risk aversion are not significant in the model. The
average willingness to pay for insurance is $51.03 per month.

Table 3. Probit Models of Willingness to Pay for Insurance: Dependent Variable Equals One if
the Subject Agreed to the Insurance at the Offered Premium

The model results for males appear in column 2. The average willingness to pay for
males is lower than the full sample at $36.34 per month. The coefficient of the baseline
optimism variable is negative and statistically significant (p-value=0.06), whereas the
coefficient of the Baseline Optimism*Information interaction variable is positive and
statistically significant (p-value=0.04). We infer that the higher the subject’s baseline
optimism, the less likely the subjects is to agree to purchase the insurance at the stated
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premium amount. As a consequence, the willingness to pay for insurance is lower for
male subjects who are overly optimistic about their cancer risks. The effect is
significantly attenuated for subjects who received the information on risk and
prevention strategies prior to filling out the questionnaire, as evidenced by the positive
and significant coefficient of the interaction of the optimism and information variables.

Like the model including all of the subjects, black men are willing to pay significantly
more for the insurance than Caucasians. Willingness to pay is increasing in income, with
an additional $1000 of income increasing willingness to pay by about $0.65 per month.
According to the model, willingness to pay for men is independent of age, marital status,
and whether or not they have a college degree. Risk aversion and cognitive ability are
also not statistically significant.

Column 3 gives the results of the insurance model for females. As expected, the
coefficient of the premium amount is negative and significant, indicating that the higher
the premium offered to the subject, the more likely they are to refuse the insurance.
The average willingness to pay for insurance implied by the model is $63.67 per month.
As with the model for males, cognitive ability and risk aversion are not statistically
significant. In contrast with the males in the sample, baseline optimism does not appear
to influence female willingness to pay for insurance. Rather, demographic variables
seem to be most important. While age did not play a role among males, the coefficient
of age in the female sample is positive and significant. Accordingly, women are willing
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to pay roughly $1 per month more for insurance as they age one year. As in the male
sample, willingness to pay for insurance is increasing in income, with an additional
$1000 in income increasing willingness to pay by about $0.35 per month. Asian women
are willing to pay more for insurance than those of other ethnicities.

VI.C. Insurance Selection Classification Model
We now turn to an effort to classify the male subjects in our sample according to their
excess willingness to pay for insurance and excess prevention effort.11 We define the
two variables that represent excess prevention and excess willingness that results from
optimism, holding all other model variables constant:

Excess Prevention Efforti  CO , PE  Control Optimismi   BO , PE  Baseline Optimismi
ExcessWTPi   BO ,WTP  Baseline Optimismi
where CO ,PE and  BO ,PE are the estimated coefficients of Control Optimism and
Baseline Optimism, respectively, in the prevention effort models, and  BO , DEM is the
estimated coefficient of Baseline Optimism in the insurance demand model. Note that
these variables measure effort and willingness to pay for insurance relative to what the
subject would engage in if he knew his true risk type. Thus positive (negative) values
represent excess (deficient) effort and willingness to pay relative to the true risk type.
We allow our measures of excess willingness to pay and effort to vary with X i , a
column vector of individual i ’s characteristics; β prev and β wtp , column vectors of
11

Because we did not find evidence that female demand for insurance is correlated with baseline optimism,
we conducted this particular exercise for male subjects only.
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parameters; and corresponding measurement and/or observation errors u prev ,i and

uwtp ,i , as follows :
Excess Prevention Efforti  X i  β prev  u prev ,i

(9a )

Excess WTPi  X i  βwtp  uwtp ,i

(9b)

For example, the joint probability that the subject falls in Class C11 is then:

p11,i  P( Excess Prevention Efforti  0; ExcessWTPi  0)

(10)

 P  X i  β prev  u prev ,i  0; X i  βwtp  uwtp ,i  0   P  X i  β prev  u prev ,i ; X i  βwtp  uwtp ,i 
If we make the simplifying assumption that the measurement/observation errors are
independently and identically distributed, with a bivariate normal distribution and
2
2
 0 and  wtp
 0, i.e.
correlation  , with  prev

 u prev ,i uwtp ,i 
,


  prev  wtp 

 0   1
N   , 
 0   

 

,
1  

(11)

then a consistent estimator for the classification probability is:





pˆ11,i   2 Xi  βˆ prev ; Xi  βˆ wtp | ˆ prev , ˆ wtp , ˆ ,

(12)

where parameters ˆ p , ˆ d , and ˆ , and parameter vectors βˆ prev and βˆ wtp are estimated
using bivariate probit. We then apply the resulting parameter estimates and individual
characteristic vector X i to (12) to estimate the respective probabilities of subject i
falling into each of the four classes, p11,i , p10,i , p01,i , and p00,i . 12

12

For clarity’s sake, and without loss of generality, we will restrict our discussion throughout this section
to estimates for the C11 classification. Calculations for the three classes (C10, C01, and C00) involves a
straightforward switching of the indices and the corresponding signs of the probit regressands.
Alternatively, we could change the direction of one or more of the inequalities in (10), and then adjust the
cdf calculation in (12) accordingly. For example,
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One must be cautious when interpreting these classifications. They represent subjects’
excess willingness to pay and excess effort relative to their true risk type, after
extracting other sources of heterogeneity in these variables. As such, they give us
information about how optimism alone may induce selection, controlling for other
factors such as cognitive ability and risk aversion that could also potentially lead to
selection in an insurance market. Thus, they are not tests for selection in total, but only
represent the possible contribution of optimism to selection. Nevertheless, when
aggregated over a sizable population they give helpful insights into the type of insurance
purchasing and preventative-related behavior in which members of the population are
likely to engage. The results of the bivariate probit model are reported in Table 4.

Dependent Variable

Prevention Effort
Indicator

WTP
Indicator

Coef.

Std. Err.

Coef.

Std. Err.

Risk Averse
Cognitive Ability

-0.024
0.001

0.035
0.079

0.020
0.002

0.036
0.086

Black
Asian
Age
Age^2
Income ($000)
College
Married
n
rho

-0.031
0.333
0.039
0.000
0.004
0.146
0.144

0.477
0.345
0.054
0.001
0.004
0.187
0.215

-0.259
0.465
-0.006
0.000
0.004
0.257
-0.437*
218
0.729
16.56
(p-value = 0.553)

Wald chisquared(18)

0.606
0.338
0.055
0.001
0.004
0.201
0.236

Table 4. Results of the Bivariate Probit Classification Model







 

pˆ10,i  P Xi  βˆ prev  u prev ,i ; Xi  βˆ wtp  uwtp,i  P Xi  βˆ prev  u prev ,i  P Xi  βˆ prev  u prev ,i ; Xi  βˆ wtp  uwtp ,i









  2 Xi  βˆ prev | ˆ prev   2 Xi  βˆ prev ; Xi  βˆ wtp | ˆ prev , ˆ wtp , ˆ .
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VI.D. Population Classification Predictions and Confidence Intervals
One useful application of this model is to estimate the proportion of our sample that
falls into each of the four classifications. Given consistent estimates for individual
classification probabilities, derived by applying (12) above, a linear combination of these
estimates yields a consistent estimator for population classification ratios:
n

n

i 1

i 1





Pˆ11  n1  E  pˆ11,i   n1   2 Xi  βˆ prev ; X i  βˆ wtp | ˆ prev , ˆ wtp , ˆ ,

(13)

where P11,i is the estimated proportion of the population that fall in the C11
classification13.

Construction of confidence intervals on the classification estimator is not nearly as
straightforward, due to the fact that the estimator employs a non-linear transformation,
the bivariate normal cumulative distribution function  2 

.

Therefore, we cannot

2
2
employ a simple linear combination of estimated variances ˆ prev
and ˆ wtp
to in turn

estimate the variance and thus the standard error ˆ P11 of classification probability P̂11 .

To solve this problem, we employed two methods: the delta method, and
bootstrapping.

13

As before, for simplicity’s sake we will restrict our discussion to the C11 classification. However,
calculation of classification predictions for the other three classes involves a straightforward switching of
the indices and the corresponding signs of the probit regressands.
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VI.D.1. Using the Delta Method to Construct Classification Confidence Intervals
As outlined in Greene (2012, pp. 68-69), Feiveson (1999), and Oehlert (1992), the delta
method can be used to estimate the standard errors of a vector of transformed
parameters. Here, we follow and adapt the derivation from Greene for a bivariate
probit objective function. We first define







fi βˆ prev ; βˆ wtp | Xi , ˆ prev , ˆ wtp , ˆ  pˆ11,i   2 Xi  βˆ prev ; Xi  βˆ wtp | ˆ prev , ˆ wtp , ˆ



(14)

as a function of the least squares estimators of the two latent biprobit indexes. We take
vector X i , containing observations on each of the p  9 regressors for subject i , as well
as sample population parameters ˆ prev , ˆ wtp , and ˆ , as given and determined.



Then, dropping the exogenous terms for clarity’s sake, and assuming that f i βˆ prev ; βˆ wtp
is both continuous and continuously differentiable at true parameter values β prev and

β wtp , we then define
 f i (βˆ prev ; βˆ wtp ) 


βˆ prev T




ˆ
ˆ
Ci (β prev ; β wtp ) 


 f i (βˆ prev ; βˆ wtp ) 


βˆ wtp T



T

(15)

as a 1  2 p row vector of first derivatives, with respect to each of the 2 p parameters.
For the sake of clarity, the derivation of the partial derivatives specified in (15), for a
bivariate normal cumulative distribution function, is shown in detail in Appendix II.
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By applying the Slutsky theorem (Greene 2012, pg. 1073) to (15), we then have:

plim fi (βˆ prev ; βˆ wtp )  fi (β prev ; βwtp )

(16a)

and

 f i (β prev ; β wtp ) 


β prev T


  Γi .
plim Ci (βˆ prev ; βˆ wtp )  


 f i (β prev ; β wtp ) 


β wtp T


T

(16b)

To apply the delta method, we then expand function f i using a first-order Taylor series
approximation, and have:

 βˆ prev  β prev 


f i (βˆ prev ; βˆ wtp )  f i (β prev ; β wtp )  Γi  

 ˆ

 β wtp  β wtp 

(17)

Then, applying Greene’s derivation (Greene 2012, pg. 69) to the bivariate normal
cumulative distribution function, the estimator of the asymptotic covariance matrix is
then:

ˆ p2

11,i

 ˆ 2  X T X 1
prev

 Est. Asy. Var  f i (βˆ prev ; βˆ wtp )   Ci 

1
ˆ ˆ prevˆ wtp  X T X 
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1
ˆ ˆ prevˆ wtp  X T X  


2
ˆ wtp
 XT X 

1


 Ci T . (18)




Estimates for ˆ p211,i and ˆ p11,i  ˆ p211,i are then readily derived from the observed data.
Figure 2 contains histograms depicting the distribution of estimated standard errors,

ˆ p , for each of the four individual classification probability estimators.
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Figure 2. Histograms of the Estimated Standard Errors of Individual Classification Probabilities

If we assume the independence of each subject’s estimate ˆ p211,i , we can show that the
classification estimator meets the conditions for the Liapunov Central Limit Theorem
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and the Lindeberg-Feller Central Limit Theorem, and therefore conclude that the
n

distribution of

1
n

ˆ
i 1

2
p11,i

is asymptotically normal (Rao 1973, pg. 127, also Amemiya

1985, pg. 92).
Then, we have:



ˆ P2  Var Pˆ11  Var  n1  pˆ11,i  

 

11



 ˆ
n

1
n ( n 1)

i 1

 ˆ P211 
 ˆ P11 

1
n 1

2
p11,i

n





0 



i 1

n

1
n ( n 1)

ˆ
i 1

2
p11,i

n


ˆ
Var
p

Cov  pˆ11,i , pˆ11, j 





11,i
i 1 
j i

n

1
n ( n 1)



1
n 1

ˆ p2

11

ˆ p2

ˆ

11

2
p11

n 1

.

(19)

Applying the normality assumption, the two end points for a 1    percent confidence
interval, for the population classification estimate P11 , can then be constructed as:

P11,LB  Pˆ11  tn 1, /2  ˆ P11

(20)

P11,UB  Pˆ11  tn 1, /2  ˆ P11

The resulting confidence interval estimates for   0.05 are shown in Table 5, alongside
estimates derived from the bootstrapping method.
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VI.D.2. Using Bootstrapping to Estimate Classification Confidence Intervals
To motivate our use of bootstrapping, we first define Z11 to be the total number of
members of sample population n who properly fall within classification C11 .14 Since the
individual classification probabilities are assumed to be independent, we can express

Z11 as the sum of n Bernoulli variables:
n

Z11   bi , where P(bi  1)  p11,i , P(bi  0)  1  p11,i .

(21)

i 1

Note that if the values for p11,i  p0 i  n, that is, if individual classification
probabilities are all equal, and deterministic (i.e., measured without error), then the
probability mass function for Z11 would follow a binomial distribution, with mean np0
and variance np0 1  p0  (Ross 2010, pg. 54). From there it would be straightforward to
calculate the probability mass function of population classification ratio P11  n1  Z11 , and
because binomial distributions are asymptotically normal as n 

1
p0

, to apply the

Central Limit Theorem and estimate confidence intervals for the distribution of P11
(Wackerly 2008, pg. 379).

Since neither of these premises is true, we must find another way of estimating the
probability mass function of Z11 , and therefore to derive confidence intervals for P11 .
In addition to the Delta Method described in section VI.D.1., we can also employ the
bootstrap method.
14

As before, we follow the discussion for classification C 11 only, for simplicity’s sake.
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Note that two stages of randomization are required to properly employ bootstrapping in
this context: a first stage to randomly assign values to measurement/observation errors

u prev ,i and uwtp ,i , and thereby to calculate individual classification probabilities p11,i ; and,
a second stage of randomization to “test” whether each individual Bernoulli variable
results in a classification or non-classification, as specified in (21). The number of
individuals thus classified then represents one bootstrapped measurement of Z11 , and
by repeating this procedure a number of times, we can estimate the distribution
function of Z11 , and thereby of P11  n1  Z11 , enabling us to estimate confidence intervals
for the proportion of our sample properly classified in C11.

In our first step, we randomly assign values to measurement/observation errors u prev ,i
and uwtp ,i for each individual, using our assumption from (11) that these stochastic error
terms are independently and identically distributed, with a bivariate normal distribution
u
u 
and with correlation  :  prev ,i , wtp ,i 


 prev  wtp 

 0   1
N   , 
 0   

 

.
1  

Once we have selected appropriate values for these error terms, we then use them to
calculate the resulting (perturbed) classification probability for each individual:





*
*
*
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ ˆ
pˆ11,
i   2  prev  X i  u prev ,i ;  wtp  X i  uwtp ,i |  prev ,  wtp ,  .
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(22)

In our second stage of randomization, we generate a separate uniform random variable

vi Uniform(0,1) for each individual, then sum the number of individuals whose





*
individual classification probability pˆ11,i exceeds their corresponding value for vi . By

doing so, we satisfy the Bernoulli condition specified in (21).

Now, as a function defined on stochastic variables, Z11 is itself stochastic, with its own
(unspecified) distribution, which may not necessarily be normal. To construct an
interval with confidence level 1    , we then empirically calculate endpoints

 k
 
Z11,LB  arg max   Count  Z11,q    m  , and
2 
k
 q 0

 m
 
Z11,UB  arg min   Count  Z11,q    m  .
2 
k
 q k

(23)

Finally, we construct end points for each respective population classification confidence
interval as:

P11,LB  m1  Z11,LB
P11,UB  m1  Z11,UB

(24)

The classifications arising from the model, with m  80 , are given in Table 5.
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C11:
Increased Effort,
Increased Ins
Demand
(Advantageous)

C10:
Increased Effort,
Decreased Ins
Demand
(Adverse)

C01:
Decreased Effort,
Increased Ins
Demand
(Adverse)

C00:
Decreased Effort,
Decreased Ins
Demand
(Advantageous)

Estimated
Proportion in
Class

0.216

0.399

0.013

0.372

Standard Error on
Estimate
(Delta Method)

0.0137

0.0081

0.0080

0.0136

0.189 - 0.243

0.383 - 0.415

0.000* - 0.029

0.345 - 0.399

0.167 - 0.266

0.330 - 0.467

0.000 - 0.026

0.305 - 0.439

Classification

95% Confidence
Interval
(Delta Method)
95% Confidence
Interval
(Bootstrapping)

Table 5. Subject Population Classified as Adverse or Advantageous Selectors Based on Bivariate
Probit Model, with Confidence Intervals derived from the Delta Method and Bootstrap
Procedure15

VI.E. Classification Results
Some 77 percent of our male subjects are thus estimated to fall into either class C00 or

C10 , indicating that these subjects will reject a policy with premium equal to the fair
price plus a risk premium. By contrast, a smaller portion (~22 percent) of our male
subjects are estimated to fall into the C11 class, implying their pessimism about their
cancer risk would lead them to purchase the insurance contract at the fair price plus a
premium, while simultaneously engaging in more prevention effort than they would if

15

* - Note that for the C01 classification, pˆ 01  0.013 is of the same order of magnitude as ˆ p  0.008 ,
01

and the estimated lower bound for p̂01 is actually negative, which has no economic meaning. We are
therefore hesitant to conclude that the normality approximation is sufficiently accurate for this particular
classification, and take the constructed confidence interval as suggestive only.
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they knew their true risk type. Indeed, they will see this policy as a bargain. Only a
small number of subjects (~2 percent) are predicted to fall in the C01 class, implying
purchase of the insurance contract while simultaneously under-investing in preventative
measures, leading to adverse selection16.

Thus, controlling for risk aversion and cognitive ability, our sample is consistent with a
market that is composed primarily of relatively low-risk types who engage in more
prevention than the subjects who refuse the fair insurance. Subjects who are optimistic
about their cancer risk, who comprise most of our sample, reject fair insurance. Thus,
pessimism about cancer risk and optimism about the efficacy of prevention effort lead
to advantageous selection.

16

Only 2 percent of our male subjects are estimated to be classified in the C01 quadrant; this is an
unsurprising result, considering the strong tendency for all subjects, both male and female, to be both
control optimistic and baseline optimistic. In order to be classified in the C01 quadrant, one would have
to exhibit both baseline pessimism (leading to higher willingness to pay) and have a control pessimism
measure of a relatively large magnitude, enough to overcome the effects of baseline pessimism on
preventative effort (in net, leading to decreased exertion). Our results suggest we cannot be confident
any of our subjects exhibited such a combination of risk misperceptions.
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VII. Discussion

The models show that heterogeneity in risk perceptions can indeed play a key role in
selection in insurance markets. For one, we show that 77 percent of our sample are
baseline optimistic while 90 percent are control optimistic, indicating that people’s
perceptions of risk and prevention efficacy are not well aligned with expert’s
assessments. We show that baseline optimism lowers male subjects’ willingness to pay
below what it would be if they knew their true risk type. We also show that baseline
optimism discourages prevention effort, raising overall cancer risk. Nevertheless,
control optimism leads subjects to engage in more effort, thereby lowering their
aggregate risk of the cancers in question.

Our classification model indicates that the interaction of baseline and control optimism
on subject’s willingness to pay for insurance and prevention efforts results in
advantageous selection where high-risk types reject coverage and only low-risk types
with high levels of prevention effort are insured. Of course, different samples could give
different outcomes. If, for example, our sample was dominated by subjects who were
sufficiently pessimistic about prevention efficacy that they under-invested in
prevention, they we would have inferred adverse selection rather than the
advantageous selection we found here.

48

One of the perhaps more intriguing findings is the difference between the insurance
models for males and females. While baseline and control optimism influence
preventative behavior for both genders, the average woman’s willingness to pay for
insurance is not a function of baseline optimism. Of course, women and men were
queried about a different set of cancers. It could well be that this is the source of this
disparity, rather than any inherent differences between how men and women act on
their risk perceptions. Others have shown that highly-publicized risks, especially
associated with a dreaded disease such as breast cancer, may lead to exaggerated
perceptions of disease risk (Slovic 1987). This could be leveraging the results for
women.

Another intriguing finding of the insurance model is that the effects of baseline
optimism on the demand for insurance were largely nullified for subjects who received
the cancer-risk information prior to taking the survey. To further investigate the effect
of information, we regressed the optimism variables on information and demographic
controls. We found that information did not influence baseline optimism significantly,
but information acted to increase the level of control optimism. These are interesting
results that we plan to explore further in future papers.

Past research has found evidence that risk aversion and cognitive ability influence
demand in some insurance markets [Guiso and Paiella (2005), Barsky et al. (1995),
Cohen and Siegelman (2010), Einav and Finkelstein (2011)]. We estimated a simple
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insurance model that included the premium and the risk aversion variable as the only
covariates, and found that coefficient of the risk aversion variable was positive and
statistically significant. Similarly, the coefficient of cognitive ability is positive and
statistically significant in an insurance model that excludes all variables except the
measure of cognitive ability and the insurance premium. This may be a symptom of
multicollinearity among the variables that is elevating the standard errors of the
coefficients of risk aversion and cognitive ability when the full range of covariates is
included. Thus, we are hesitant to conclude decisively that cognitive ability and risk
aversion do not play a role in cancer insurance demand. It could well be that
measurement error and/or multicollinearity are leading to an overestimate of their
standard errors in the insurance models. Nonetheless, risk aversion and cognitive ability
are not significant predictors of prevention effort even in simple models, and therefore
the case for any selection arising from these variables in this sample is very weak.
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VIII. Conclusions

In this paper, we report the results of a survey of 474 men and women that analyzes
willingness to pay for cancer-care insurance, factors that affect the demand for
insurance, and variables that influence cancer-prevention activities. In particular, we
seek to test whether risk misperception leads to selection, controlling for other possible
sources of selection such as cognitive ability and risk aversion.

We offer evidence that supports Spinnewjn ‘s (2013) hypothesis that selection may
occur as a result of subjective misperceptions about baseline cancer risks and the
efficacy of health-risk reduction activities. Our statistical results indicate that the more
optimistic a male subject is concerning his baseline cancer risk, the lower his willingness
to pay for cancer insurance. We do not find evidence of this effect with females,
however. We also find that subjects (both male and female) who over-estimate the
return to preventative behaviors are more likely to invest in preventative effort, thereby
lowering their cancer risk and expected associated health-care costs. The pattern of
insurance, choice, prevention behavior, and risk misperception can lead to adverse or
advantageous selection, depending on the relative influence of control and baseline
optimism on behavior.

The models control for other variables, such as risk aversion and cognitive ability that
have been shown to lead to selection in insurance markets. We find weak evidence that
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these variables influence willingness to pay for insurance, but no evidence that they are
correlated with preventative effort. Still, these relationships may be present but
clouded by multicollinearity and/or measurement error problems. We recommend that
future studies elicit alternative measures of cognitive ability and risk aversion to further
examine their influence on demand for insurance and prevention activities.

This is the first empirical study we know of that investigates risk misperception as a
source of selection. We believe the results reported here are useful to researchers
interested in risk communication, risk perception as well as selection in insurance
markets. That said, there are limitations to the analysis. For one, the data is based on a
hypothetical market so that people never actually purchased or refused the insurance.
People may well make different choices in a hypothetical market, in the context of a
survey, than they make when purchasing actual insurance policies.
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Appendix I: Notes on Survey Methodology

As described in the Acknowledgements, we received a total of 549 completed survey
responses. An additional 42 respondents began, but did not complete, the surveys. Of
the completed surveys we received, we rejected 71 (leaving 478), for the following
reasons:
-

Duplicate Internet Protocol Address or Amazon Mechanical Turk ID: 28
Had Cancer: 23
Latitude/Longitude Outside United States: 11
Completed Survey in Under 5 Minutes: 9
Total: 71

As described in the Overview, we conducted the survey using Qualtrics, and solicited
respondents through Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). Surveys were conducted on
separate dates, between October 2013 and September 2014. Separate surveys were
issued for colon, bladder, breast, and prostate cancers, and for each of these, a further
difference was that half of the surveys contained information booklets at the beginning
of the survey, and others did not. Respondents were unaware that the surveys were
different; the only difference they were able to perceive was whether a survey was
meant for women or men.
Each survey was open for several days, and was cut off automatically by AMT when we
reached the target number of desired respondents. We rejected surveys that were
completed in under 5 minutes, reasoning that such surveys were likely not carefully
read or answered by respondents. We also rejected surveys that originated from the
same IP address, or using the same AMT ID, as a previous survey, reasoning that these
were likely the same respondent, or possibly a household member. In either case,
selection bias could be present if we allowed more than one response per IP address or
AMT ID. We rejected surveys from those who have had or currently have cancer,
because the HCRI relative risk factors do not apply to such individuals, and hence any
measures we could develop for these individuals using the HCRI would be invalid.
Finally, we rejected survey responses that originate from outside the United States, as
the HCRI relative risk factors are specific to the U.S. population.
A possible source of measurement error that could bias results is that due to
respondents who began, but did not complete the survey. As noted above, 42 of the
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591 persons who initiated the survey did not complete it. The vast majority of these
quit the survey within the first minute, as measured and recorded by Qualtrics.
As cited in Gravelle and Lachapelle (2015), procedures for handling missing data, and for
imputing nonresponse in surveys, is addressed in Allison (2001), Little and Rubin (2002),
and Rubin (1987). However, the majority of our incomplete surveys contained no
responses at all; by design within Qualtrics, we were able to force responses to all
questions we posed to respondents. We were left with 549 fully complete surveys, and
42 surveys that contained little or no data at all. Therefore, techniques for imputing
nonresponse were not applicable to the majority of the 42 incomplete surveys.
We nevertheless should consider the possibility that these aborted surveys may have
led to measurement error in one or more of our estimations. We reason that while
some of these terminated surveys may have been due to internet connection or other
technical difficulties, which would likely have been uncorrelated with the regressors and
therefore unlikely to bias results, the majority of these terminated surveys were likely
due to respondent fatigue, or laziness. If “laziness” is then correlated with one of our
regressors, such as age, gender, income, or education level, then this would tend to bias
our results. However, as the majority of terminated surveys occurred before
demographic questions were asked, many in the booklet phase before any questions at
all had been asked, we have no way of estimating possible correlations for these
subjects. With a 7 percent survey abort rate, we do however conclude that any bias in
our results is likely to have been small.
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Appendix II: Derivation of Partial Derivative of Bivariate Normal
Cumulative Distribution Function

In (15) we reference the partial derivatives of the bivariate normal cumulative
f (βˆ ; βˆ )
f (βˆ ; βˆ )
distribution functions, i prev T wtp and i prev T wtp , which we will develop here.
βˆ prev
βˆ wtp
From (14) we have:









fi βˆ prev ; βˆ wtp   2 Xi  βˆ prev ; Xi  βˆ wtp | ˆ prev , ˆ wtp , ˆ .

From Johnson and Wichern (2007, pg. 151), we have the bivariate normal probability
density function:

2  prev ,i , prev ,i  

1
2 prev wtp

with  prev ,i 



2
 1   2  2  prev ,i wtp ,i   wtp

,i 
 exp    prev ,i


2
1 
1 2
 
 2 

( II .1)

X i  βˆ prev   prev
X  βˆ  wtp
,  wtp ,i  i wtp
,
ˆ prev
ˆ wtp







 prev  E X i  βˆ prev , and  prev  E X i  βˆ wtp .
In the following derivation, we substitute into (II.1) our parameter estimates ˆ prev , ˆ wtp ,

ˆ , ˆ prev 

n

1
n

 Xi  βˆ prev , and ˆ wtp 
i 1

n

1
n

 X  βˆ
i

i 1

wtp

.

The bivariate normal probability density function is integrable, leading to the following
specification for the bivariate normal cumulative distribution function:
 2  prev ,i , wtp ,i  





 f i βˆ prev ; βˆ wtp 

 prev ,i  wtp ,i

1
2ˆ prev ,iˆ wtp ,i 1  ˆ 2
1
2ˆ prevˆ wtp 1  ˆ 2



 





 prev ,i  wtp ,i
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 1  x 2  2 ˆ xy  y 2  
exp   
   dxdy
1  ˆ 2

 2

 1  x 2  2 ˆ xy  y 2  
exp   
   dxdy
1  ˆ 2

 2

( II .2)

As stated previously, we will take βˆ prev and βˆ wtp to be vectors of estimated coefficients of
the latent bivariate probit indexes. Without loss of generality, and for clarity’s sake, we
arbitrarily chose a coefficient in vector βˆ , say ˆ , with values for j between 1 and
prev

j

p , and then calculate the partial derivative of f i with respect to ˆ j . Note that ˆ j is
stochastic, and as the bivariate normal distribution is both continuous and continuously
derivable across its domain, we have:









f i βˆ prev ; βˆ wtp
f i βˆ prev ; βˆ wtp  prev ,i


 prev ,i
ˆ j
ˆ j

( II .3)

The right-hand side of the product in (II.3) is readily derived as

 prev ,i
  X i  βˆ prev  ˆ prev  X ij

,

 
ˆ prev
ˆ j
ˆ j 
 ˆ prev

( II .4)

where X ij is the observation for exogenous variable j made on subject i .
We can then apply the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus (Golberg and Cho 2010,
pg. 11) to the left-hand side of the product in (II.3):



f i βˆ prev ; βˆ wtp
 prev ,i





   
2

prev ,i

, wtp ,i 

 prev ,i


1


2ˆ prevˆ wtp 1  ˆ 2  prev ,i
1
2ˆ prevˆ wtp 1  ˆ 2

 wtp ,i







 prev ,i  wtp ,i

 1  x 2  2 ˆ xy  y 2  
exp
 dxdy 
  
 


2
1  ˆ

 2
  


2
 1  x 2  2 ˆ x prev ,i   prev

,i 
exp   
  dx

1  ˆ 2
 
 2 

( II .5)

Then, rationalizing the exponent in (II.5) we have:





2
2
2
2
2
2
1  x  2 ˆ x prev ,i   prev ,i 
1  x  2ˆ x prev ,i  ˆ  1  ˆ   prev ,i 
 

2
1  ˆ 2
2
1  ˆ 2
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2
2
2
2 2
2
ˆ prev ,i  
 prev
1  x  2 ˆ x prev ,i y  ˆ  prev ,i 1  ˆ  2 
1   x  
,i

 

 prev ,i   


2
1  ˆ 2
1  ˆ 2
2
2
1  ˆ 2








2
 prev
,i

2

2

ˆ prev ,i 
1  x  
 
 . Substituting back into (II.5), we have:
2  1  ˆ 2 



f i βˆ prev ; βˆ wtp
 prev ,i



1
2 1   2 ˆ prevˆ wtp

e

 2prev ,i /2

 wtp ,i







2

 x  
ˆ prev ,i  
1
exp   
   dx
 2  1  ˆ 2  

 


( II .6)

Now, changing variables of integration and substituting into (II.6), let

u





ˆ prev ,i
x  
1  ˆ

2



f i βˆ prev ; βˆ wtp
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ˆ prev ,i  
1
exp   
   dx
 2  1  ˆ 2  
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f i βˆ prev ; βˆ wtp
 prev ,i

        A ,

where A 

1

prev ,i

1

( II .7)

ˆ wtp

1
1  ˆ 2



wtp ,i

ˆ prev ,i  .
 

Combining results from (II.4) and (II.7) into (II.3), we have:

57









f i βˆ prev ; βˆ wtp
fi βˆ prev ; βˆ wtp  prev ,i  1  prev ,i   1  A   X ij 





 prev ,i
ˆ wtp
ˆ j
ˆ j
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f i βˆ prev ; βˆ wtp
 j




ˆ prev ,i 
X ij
 
 1  prev ,i   1  wtp ,i

2


ˆ prevˆ wtp
ˆ
1





( II .8)

where again for clarity we have substituted:

 prev ,i 

X i  βˆ prev  ˆ prev
X  βˆ  ˆ wtp
,  wtp ,i  i wtp
.
ˆ prev
ˆ wtp

Since ˆ j was chosen arbitrarily from βˆ prev , we can similarly derive the other partial
derivatives in

f i (βˆ prev ; βˆ wtp )
:
βˆ T
prev

f i (βˆ prev ; βˆ wtp )
1

T
ˆ
ˆ prevˆ wtp
β prev
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2


ˆ
1
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ˆ prev ,i  


 X i 2  1  prev ,i   1 
2

ˆ
1










  wtp ,i  
ˆ prev ,i  
 X ip  1  prev ,i   1 

2



ˆ
1 



T


ˆ prev ,i 
f i (βˆ prev ; βˆ wtp )
 
1

 1  prev ,i   1  wtp ,i
  Xi
T
2


ˆ prevˆ wtp
βˆ prev
ˆ
1





( II .9)

Now, by symmetry we can repeat steps described above in (II.3) through (II.9) for any
arbitrary ˆ in βˆ , yielding:
k

wtp
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f i βˆ prev ; βˆ wtp
ˆ wtp ,i 
 
X ik

 1  wtp ,i   1  prev ,i

2


ˆ prevˆ wtp
ˆk
ˆ
1





( II .10)

and

  prev ,i  
ˆ wtp ,i 
f i (βˆ prev ; βˆ wtp )
1







  Xi


1
2


ˆ prevˆ wtp 1 wtp ,i
βˆ wtp T
ˆ
1





( II .11)

Finally, substituting (II.9) and (II.11) into (15), we arrive at

T

 f i (βˆ prev ; βˆ wtp ) 


βˆ prev T


1

 
ˆ
ˆ
Ci (β prev ; β wtp ) 


ˆ prevˆ wtp
 f i (βˆ prev ; βˆ wtp ) 


βˆ wtp T



T




ˆ prev ,i 
 
 1  prev ,i   1  wtp ,i
 Xi 



1  ˆ 2







 ,



ˆ wtp ,i 
        prev ,i  
  Xi 
1
2


 1 wtp ,i

1  ˆ





for which values can readily be calculated given observation vector X i , and estimates
previously derived for ˆ prev , ˆ prev , and ˆ ; the resulting vector Ci can then be
substituted into (18) to yield a consistent estimate for ˆ p211,i .
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( II .12)

Appendix III: Copy of Qualtrics Survey

In the following twenty pages we show a copy of the survey used for men, for colon
cancer. Similar surveys were used for women for colon cancer, and for both women and
men for the other three cancers, as appropriate. Note that approximately half of survey
respondents were presented with information on one of the three cancers, and the
other half were not.
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